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consumer price adjustments. Structural reforms to remove price rigidities are key.
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1. See for example ECB
(2012), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr
essconf/2012/html/is1204
04.en.html.
THE DEBATE ON ADJUSTMENT IN THE EURO AREA is
becoming more heated and confused. The
European Central Bank seems to argue that
southern European countries can become more
competitive while Germany would not become
less competitive1. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, Paul de Grauwe of the London School of
Economics has argued that the adjustment is
predominantly being done by the south (De
Grauwe, 2012). De Grauwe investigates relative
unit labour costs, finding significant downward
adjustment in Ireland and Greece and moderate
adjustment in Spain. In contrast, in northern
European countries, only a moderate deterioration
in relative unit labour costs is found.
So is adjustment in the euro area asymmetric or
symmetric? This Policy Contribution starts from a
simple definition of symmetry which looks at the
average inflation rate only, ignoring higher
moments of the distribution. This approach is
taken because monetary policy in the euro area
aims to stabilise euro-area inflation, and euro-area
inflation is the weighted average inflation rate of
the countries of the euro area. A recession and
lower inflation rates in one part of the euro area
would mean that monetary policy conditions are
too tight in this part, and too expansionary in the
rest of the euro area. Inflation should rise in the
part of the euro area where monetary policy is too
expansionary, and this should lead to a symmetric
adjustment.
A good definition of asymmetric adjustment would
be that in this situation, the average inflation rate
would fall (or increase). If it falls, inflation in some
countries would fall while inflation in the others
would stay unchanged – and vice-versa.
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Figure 1: Inflation and core inflation rate in the
euro area
Source: Eurostat. Note: CPI monthly data, annual rate of
change.
‘Is adjustment in the euro area asymmetric or symmetric? Consumer price index inflation rates
from individual countries provide no strong evidence for asymmetry. Ireland seriously undercuts
the euro-area average but Greece, Spain and Italy stay above the average.’
Alternatively, inflation could be expected to remain
close to the goal set by the ECB for the euro area
as a whole. 
ADJUSTMENT IN THE EUROZONE:
SYMMETRIC OR ASYMMETRIC?
Figure 1 shows that inflation and in particular core
inflation remains close to two percent. The figure
does not provide strong evidence of asymmetry.
Consumer price index (CPI) inflation rates from
individual countries give a better insight into the
drivers of average inflation. Implicitly, they provide
a distribution of inflation rates in the euro area.
There is again no strong evidence for asymmetry.
Figure 2 shows the average inflation rates during
2009-11. Ireland seriously undercuts the euro-
area average but Greece, Spain and Italy stay
above the average.
Since these figures might have been distorted by
the severe recession in 2009, Figure 3 focuses on
2011. Again, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal have
inflation rates above the euro-area average, while
France is below and Germany is at the average.
These figures thus do not support the claim that
the 'south' of Europe is adjusting while the 'north'
of the euro area is not adjusting. In fact, neither
the south nor the north appear to adjust.
Inflation figures are affected by changes in
taxation. Eurostat computes inflation rates
adjusted to take account of the impact of such tax
changes. Figure 4 plots the inflation rates
adjusted for such tax effects. 
Tax effects explain to some extent why CPI
adjustment in some countries was weak. In
Greece in particular, inflation adjusted for tax
effects is below the euro-area average while
overall inflation is, in effect, above. However, tax
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effects do not change the overall picture that there
is no strong evidence of asymmetry. In fact, Italy’s
higher inflation rate roughly compensates for
Spain’s lower inflation rate. More fundamentally,
monetary policy does not take account of changes
in inflation due to taxation. Finally, it is final prices,
not pre-tax prices, that actually matters for
competitiveness.
However, consumer price inflation is not the same
as unit labour cost (ULC) developments. Figure 5
shows nominal ULC developments for the total
economy during 2010 and 2011. There are
significant falls in Greece, Ireland, Spain and
Portugal relative to the euro area average.
However, ULC in Italy remains above the average
and German ULC is also slightly above the
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Figure 2: Average CPI inflation rate, 2009-11
Source: Eurostat. Note: inflation measured as the average
during 2009, 2010 and 2011.
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Figure 3: Inflation rates in 2011
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 4: HICP inflation adjusted for tax effects,
2009-11 growth
Source: Eurostat, Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
Note: Prices at constant tax rates for each month are computed
by subtracting the taxes applicable in that month and adding the
taxes according to the rates in force in the previous December.
The figure for Austria is given for 2009-10 due to missing data.
Eu
ro
 a
re
a
Ire
la
nd
Gr
ee
ce
Sp
ai
n
Ita
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Be
lg
iu
m
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Au
st
ria
Fi
nl
an
d
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
2010-11
2011
Figure 5: Average ULC developments, 2010-11
and during 2011
Source: Ameco.
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average. If the special effects resulting from the
recession year 2009/10 are taken out and the
focus is put on 2011, the picture looks quite
symmetric in the sense that all countries of the
north have ULC growth rates above the euro-area
average and all countries of the south except Italy
have ULC growth below the average.
Therefore, for ULC developments there is some
evidence of a symmetric adjustment while for
inflation we could not find any evidence of
adjustment. Figure 6 helps visualise the relatively
weak correlation between ULC and CPI inflation. It
shows that the falls in ULC that are observed in
Greece, Spain and Portugal do not translate into
gains in terms of prices as measured by the CPI (a
similar picture can be seen when looking at output
prices). Only in Ireland have changes in ULC and
CPI gone hand in hand.
This disconnection between ULC and CPI can be
explained by a number of factors. Some ULC gains
are due to massive lay-offs of unproductive
workers, explaining the surge in unemployment.
Here, ULC gains are 'artificial' in the sense that
they do not solve the competitiveness problem. In
fact, they appear to result from the lay-off of the
least productive workers or cuts in employment in
the least productive sectors. A quantification of
the magnitude of this effect would be highly
instructive. 
The analysis can be refined by looking at
developments in compensation per employee.
Figure 7 documents clear signs of a symmetric
adjustment in this respect. Compensation per
employee has fallen in Ireland and Greece and has
also been below the euro-area average in Spain,
Italy and Portugal. In turn, compensation has been
above the euro area in Belgium, Germany, France,
Austria and Finland.
However, these changes in labour compensation
rates have again not been reflected by consumer
price developments. Figure 8 relates the two
variables and again no strong correlation can be
detected.
Looking forward, the overall picture remains
worrying. The European Commission forecasts
that CPI will grow below the euro-area average in
Ireland, Greece, Spain and France during 2011-13
(Figure 9). German inflation is forecast to be at
ULC change 2009-11
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Figure 6: CPI and ULC Changes relative to the
euro area, 2009-11
Source: Bruegel based on Ameco.
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Figure 8: Nominal compensation/employee and
CPI changes 2010-11 relative to euro area average
Source: Bruegel based on Ameco.
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Figure 7: Nominal compensation per employee:
average annual changes, 2010-11
Source: Ameco.
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with compensation per employee falling below the
euro-area average in southern euro-area coun-
tries, and compensation increasing above the
average in northern euro-area countries. However,
wage costs and unit labour costs, ie wage costs
adjusted for productivity effects, remain highly
disconnected from relative inflation rates.
The absence of a strong transmission mechanism
between ULC and wage adjustments and inflation
significantly hampers effective adjustment in the
euro area. The deep recessions in Spain and
Greece cannot lead to symmetric adjustment in
other countries as long as Spanish and Greek con-
sumer prices continue to rise above the euro-area
average. Indeed, the main mechanism for achiev-
ing symmetry is to change average inflation
expectations. This would lead to a monetary policy
easing. This easing, in turn, will increase demand
in Germany, leading to higher inflation rates in Ger-
many, so that the average is stabilised. The euro
area is thus in a difficult situation where severe
recessions lead to massive lay-offs in some coun-
tries, but price levels do not move. This, in turn,
prevents monetary policy from triggering higher
consumer inflation in Germany. Artificially
increasing German inflation rates would lead to a
tightening of monetary policy if the ECB was to
stick to its mandate. This in turn would aggravate
the recession in the southern euro-area countries.
While monetary policy is currently made more dif-
ficult by the extraordinary stress in the financial
system, this should not prevent the operation of
adjustment mechanism via monetary policy. First,
monetary policy has not yet reached the zero
lower bound. Moreover, even if it reached the zero
lower bound it could commit credibly to keeping
rates low for an extended period of time, thereby
reducing the longer-term rates. Second, while the
monetary policy transmission channel may be
impaired in the south of Europe, the key to our
argument is that monetary policy will be expan-
sionary in the northern countries in response to a
drop in consumer price inflation. It is also impera-
tive that macroprudential instruments are not
used to dampen the credit boom in Germany, and
monetary policy can play its full part.
A number of significant policy conclusions can be
drawn from this analysis:
the average, while Italy is expected to grow above
the average. If the Commission forecast for Italy is
correct, it would be a serious source of concern,
because Italian inflation would largely offset lower
inflation rates in Spain and Greece, leaving little
scope for German inflation to increase. The
Spanish situation is also quite worrying because
its CPI inflation rate undercuts the euro-area
inflation rate by an annual average of only 0.5
percentage points, which would imply a very
drawn-out adjustment process. German inflation
at the average is also not a good sign.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Overall, the data presented in this Policy Contribu-
tion shows that there has been very little adjust-
ment in the euro area in terms of consumer prices.
In addition there has been only a very modest
adjustment of inflation adjusted for tax effects.
The data also shows no evidence for asymmetric
adjustment in inflation rates. Ireland records sig-
nificantly lower inflation rates, but most other
countries have been relatively close to the aver-
age. Looking forward, very significant adjustment
in Greece is forecast, but adjustment in other
countries remains weak, or is even moving in the
wrong direction, such as in Italy and Germany.
At the same time, significant adjustment in ULC in
Spain and Greece has been observed, suggesting
some degree of asymmetry. More research is
needed to better understand the striking
disconnection between ULC and CPI2.
For wages, symmetric adjustment is observable
2. A forthcoming Bruegel
paper (Darvas, 2012) will
examine this issue.
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Figure 9: Average CPI inflation, 2012-13
Source: Ameco.
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3. Ruscher and Wolff
(2009) analyse this
internal adjustment.
4. See for example Ulbrich
(2012).
1 Differences in size matter. Take a hypothetical
monetary union consisting of Ireland and
Germany only, with the latter being ten times
larger. In such a monetary union, a reduction in
inflation in Ireland by one percentage point will
require an increase in inflation in Germany of
only 0.1 percentage point if the average is to
remain unchanged. Big adjustments in small
countries will lead to only small movements in
Germany as long as the ECB stabilises the
average. Or put differently, small countries will
always have to do the adjustment themselves,
given that they are basically price takers.
Symmetric movements in Germany require
price adjustments in large countries such as
Italy and Spain.
2 Cost reductions do not necessarily translate
into price reductions. Product market
regulation, lack of competition and other
factors contribute to downward price rigidity. In
fact, it may be no accident that the most
deregulated economy, Ireland, actually saw
costs and prices fall simultaneously. It should
also be noted that Ireland has had the
strongest turnaround in its trade balance,
suggesting that price adjustment is important.
3 Rigidities that prevent prices from falling
should be addressed. This will have a double
benefit. First, it will help monetary policy to be
much more effective in rebalancing the euro
area. Moreover, changes in product and
consumer prices will be conducive to the
adjustment in trade patterns. In fact, structural
reforms are key to help facilitate the
reallocation of labour to the tradable sector and
to reduce prices3. This option is currently being
pursued but with limited success. Significantly
more research is needed to understand which
structural reforms will be most effective in
fostering the adjustment, improving exports
and increasing employment.
4 Cuts in wages (or major increases in labour
productivity due to training or other factors)
have been insufficient in a number of
countries. Ultimately, wage cuts will lead to
export-oriented firms requiring a large labour
input to expand or locate to the country. Only
then will unemployment decrease. While wage
adjustments are visible in some countries, the
absence of adjustment in Italy is particularly
worrying. Also the forecast higher than average
inflation rates in Italy need to be addressed.
5 If downward price rigidities remain insur-
mountable, monetary policy that will stabilise
the average inflation rate at two percent will
imply no price adjustment in the euro area. The
result will be very long and sustained periods
of unemployment and weak growth. This will
increase the political pressure to either change
the average inflation rate or to achieve price
adjustment by leaving the euro area. Both
options entail significant costs to different
parts of the euro area and will likely shape the
debate in the months and years to come.
6 Arithmetic cannot be defeated. Significantly
lower inflation rates in southern Europe will
automatically lead to higher inflation rates in
Germany. Monetary policy will ensure a
symmetric adjustment process and one should
refrain from using other instruments to reduce
the effectiveness of this mechanism. It is
refreshing to see that some people at the
Bundesbank4, as well as German finance
minister Wolfgang Schäuble, understand this
basic symmetry. After all, arithmetic is
absolute, and both sides need to move. 
‘Cost reductions do not necessarily translate into price reductions. Product market regulation,
lack of competition and other factors contribute to downward price rigidity. It may be no
accident that the most deregulated economy, Ireland, saw costs and prices fall simultaneously.’
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